![]() They were armed for self-defence, but eventually hired Somali gunmen to guard their positions.Ĭomplicating matters further, in August both Aidid and Sahnoun heard over the BBC World Service, without first being consulted by UN HQ, that 3,000 more “peacekeeping” troops would be sent, with or without the approval of the warlords. The symbolic Pakistani force of 500 blue berets, known as UN Operation in Somalia began arriving in September. Negotiations to bring the first 500 UN troops, approved by UN Security Council in April 1992, dragged on for weeks, as warlords angled for advantage. He was outspoken, and his frankness was able to briefly improve UN reputation in Somalia. He understood the power politics, their needs and expectations of those with guns and worked to create an alternative leadership. An Algerian diplomat, he was the only senior UN official who understood the unique requirements of Somali peacemakers, elders and warriors. In July 1992, UN chief Boutros Ghali publicly warned the world was, “Fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.” What the UN, at the time, did get right was appointing Mohamed Sahnoun as SRSG. While feeding centres doubled in number, ships carrying food were often turned away from Mogadishu port by mortar fire, as rival militias fought for spoils before they even arrived. The problem was not always the lack of food but the inability to get it to the hungry – the hallmark of Somalia’s famine. Africa had not been witness to widespread starvation since the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85. Ali Mahdi’s Abgal subclan was furious at him for refusing to take part in the fighting to remove Barre.ĭespite victory, the results of the famine continued to increase. It confirmed his status as chief warrior, enabling him to create a political alliance of southern and central clans, enhancing his claim to rule. Big Mouth died on 2nd January 1995.Īidid’s triumph over Barre resounded across Somalia. Costing US$1,800 per day, Barre was granted exile in Nigeria. By April, Barre was forced to flee to Kenya, where he and 20 aides took “temporary asylum” in Nairobi’s luxurious Safari Park hotel on Thika road. ![]() Aidid launched a final offensive mid-March 1992. As the famine began to spiral out of control, Aidid made sure his promise to central region elders to finally removing Siad Barre. ![]() The famine alarm bells that rang back in December 1991. They dictated the rules for an increasing number of new aid agencies, forcing upon them the dilemma: how to save the dying without subsidising the very gunmen who caused it?įarah Aidid controlled the port and were part of the 2-day clash over looting 8,000MT of food at a nearby warehouse to win its share. ![]() Somalia’s gunmen still reigned, patrolling the streets. Somalia’s famine was finally “discovered” by Lame Stream in August 1992 largely due to aid workers and independent journalists who remained on the ground forcing the UN to take notice. Q: Isn’t there a better way to control these gunmen?Ī: Somebody did suggest one – carpet bomb Somalia with ecstasy, because it curbs hunger and makes everyone love each other.
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